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Abstract 
 
 
In many industries broad cross-license agreements are considered a useful method to 
obtain freedom to operate and to avoid patent litigation. In this paper I study the 
previously neglected dynamic trade-off between litigating and cross-licensing that firms 
face to protect their intellectual property. I present a model of bargaining with learning in 
which firms’ decisions to litigate or crosslicense depend on their investments in 
technology specific assets. In particular the model predicts that where firms’ sunk costs 
are higher, their incentive to litigate and delay a cross-license agreement is lower. In 
addition, the bargaining game shows how firms with intermediate values of asset 
specificity tend to engage in inefficient "persuasive litigation". Using a novel dataset on 
the US semiconductor industry I obtain empirical results consistent with those suggested 
by the model. Combining model intuition with some empirical figures, I evaluate possible 
effects of the currently debated patent litigation reform. 
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1 Introduction
During the past few years various scholars1 and industry representatives have drawn
attention to specific inefficiencies generated by the patent system in several industries.
In particular, Shapiro (2001) has argued that a "patent thicket" has appeared that
renders it difficult to commercialize a new technology. In some industries the number
of intellectual property rights a firm requires to produce a new product is so large,
and their ownership is so dispersed, that it is quite easy to unintentionally infringe
on a patent. In this environment there is, therefore, a hold-up problem: when the
manufacturer starts selling its product a patentee might show up threatening to shut
production down unless it is paid high royalties.
This issue’s relevance is indicated by the endogenous reaction taken by firms
operating in industries where the thicket is especially severe. In fact, various business
arrangements enabling firms to cut through the thicket have appeared. The objective
of this paper is to analyze one of these arrangements: broad cross-license agreements.2
A cross-license agreement is a contract between two companies that grants each
the right to practice the other’s patents. In other words it is a bilateral agreement
in which two firms choose not to enforce intellectual property rights between them.
This paper focuses on broad cross-licensing, i.e. on agreements covering the entire
patent portfolios or patents in some extensive technology class.
There are three reasons why these contracts are worth a deep scientific scrutiny.
First, the existence of contracts in which firms choose to dispose of intellectual prop-
erty rights granting them monopoly rents is a puzzle for economists. To understand
the reasons behind this puzzling behavior may lead to a better comprehension not
only of intellectual property enforcement but also of the more general impact of trans-
action costs on property rights enforcement.
Second, despite their prevalence, cross-license agreements have so far attracted
little empirical and theoretical attention from economists compared to other arrange-
ments used to transfer intellectual property (e.g. patent licensing, patent pools and
standard setting). A study of these contracts, that lie in between arm’s length con-
tracting (patent licensing) and firms full integration (merger or acquisition), may offer
valuable insights into firm choices of organizational structure.
The third motivation is a more practical one. The existence of a patent thicket
that raises firms cost of innovation has led various economists to question the patent
system as the best incentive scheme (a review of this literature is offered in Gallini and
Scotchmer (2002)). From this perspective, when two firms cross-license their patent
portfolios, they react extremely against the patent system renouncing completely to
enforce their intellectual property rights. Therefore, a better understanding of the
reasons leading to cross-licensing and of the characteristics of the firms involved may
1Among these Shapiro (2001), Heller and Eiseberg (1998), Barton (2000) and Pooley (2000).
2Other possible business arrangements include patent pools. Their relevance and their efficiency
properties have been analyzed in Lerner and Tirole (2004) and Lerner et al. (2005) and Choi (2002).
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help identifying who suffers most from the inefficiencies of the patent system and may
help quantifying this efficiency loss. These insights can be very valuable in evaluating
the arguments behind the recent calls for patent system reforms.
To study the determinants of broad cross-license agreements, I focus the analysis
on the semiconductor industry. This industry is characterized both by rapid techno-
logical change and by cumulative innovation. In fact, during the past four decades,
semiconductor technology has registered a continuous and steady progress with the
number of transistors in a chip doubling every year since 1965.3 In addition, because
of its complexity, a semiconductor product is likely to be covered by hundreds if not
thousands of individual patents related both to the transistors and to the circuit
design (Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and Ziedonis (2004)).
Because of these features of the technological setting, a semiconductor firm re-
quires to cut through a patent thicket in order to legally manufacture and sell its prod-
ucts. In fact, as previous studies have already noticed (Grindley and Teece (1997),
Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and Ziedonis (2003)), the patent thicket looks extremely
severe in this industry making cross-license agreements quite a common practice.
I begin the analysis of cross-license agreements developing a theoretical framework
in which two semiconductor firms are involved in a sequence of patent infringements.
More specifically, in each period of an infinite horizon bargaining game, one of the
two firms is chosen by nature to be a patentee producer facing an infringing action
from the other firm.
In the absence of a broad cross-license agreement, firms solve these infringements
with costly litigation. In particular, a court will determine whether the defendant
is found to have infringed and will issue an injunction forcing the infringer to shut
production down if this is the case.
I assume that, when halting production, the infringer sustains a cost that in-
creases with the specificity of its technology assets. This important assumption comes
from the empirical observation that the losses due to stopping or varying production
processes are more detrimental for firms with large sunk costs (Hall and Ziedonis
(2001) and Ziedonis (2004)).
If two firms sign a cross-license agreement, they commit not to litigate present and
future infringements and therefore to share duopoly profits. Agreement over a cross-
license contract is reached through a bargaining procedure. To study this negotiation
problem, I build on the theoretical work of Yildiz (2003, 2004). In particular, I extend
his “divide-the-dollar” game developing a framework in which firms bargain over a
cross-license agreement and introducing a per-period outside option (the litigation
payoff) that firms receive in case of disagreement.
Analyzing the equilibrium of this model, I obtain various testable results. In
particular, the most important finding is that both the decision to cross-license and
the timing of the agreement depend crucially on firms’ investment specificity: the
3Recent estimates in the Semiconductor Industry Association 2005 annual report predict that
this exponential rate of progress will continue at least until 2020.
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larger are firms’ sunk costs the sooner a cross-license agreement will be arranged.
Specifically, the model predicts that firms with low sunk costs never agree upon a
cross-license and that firms with high asset specificity agree at the first infringement.
In addition, firms with intermediate levels of investments in specific technology reach
a cross-license agreement after some litigation.
There are two trade-offs leading to this sorting. First, all firms face a basic trade-
off between cross-licensing and litigating. A cross-license agreement is costly because
it reduces each innovation monopoly surplus to a duopoly surplus. Nevertheless, to
enforce the monopoly surplus firms have to litigate sustaining a cost that increases
with their asset specificity and, if sunk costs are high enough, this loss reduces the
litigation surplus below the one they can obtain with a broad cross-license. Therefore,
firms with low sunk costs never agree upon a cross-license, as perpetual litigation
guarantees them a larger surplus.
The second and more subtle trade-off is faced only by firms for which cross-
licensing is efficient and it involves the timing of the agreement. More precisely, each
firm has an incentive to litigate and delay the agreement because waiting reduces
opponent’s optimism and therefore decreases opponent’s requested surplus share.
However, litigation is costly and its cost increases with firms’ investment in sunk
technology. As a result, only if sunk costs are not too large the benefit of delay
exceeds its cost and firms litigate before signing an agreement.
This result is valuable for two reasons. First, it shows that the effects of the
patent thicket, and therefore the incentives to cross-license, are not homogeneous
across firms. In fact, because firms with large investment in specific assets suffer most
from infringements, they have the greatest incentives to cross-license their intellectual
properties.
Second, the model unveils a particular inefficiency that has not been noticed in
the previous literature which I am going to label "persuasive litigation". In fact,
firms with intermediate levels of sunk costs litigate not because it is efficient for them
to do so, but because they want to obtain a better deal in a cross-license agreement.
This litigation is inefficient because it reduces the surplus that parties will share.
Disentangling this inefficient litigation is valuable for policy analysis. Indeed, I show
that it implies that policies leading to an increase in the amount of patent litigation
(e.g. a reduction in legal costs or a strengthening of patent rights) have an ambiguous
welfare impact.
To test the predictions of the model, I compiled a new dataset based on patent
litigation and cross-license agreements that semiconductor firms disclosed in their
Security Exchange Commission filings. More specifically, following Hall and Ziedonis
(2001), I identified from Compustat a sample of 95 publicly traded U.S. firms whose
principal line of business is semiconductor and related devices (SIC 3674), that were
active from 1998 to 2003 and that engaged in some patent activity after 1988.
In particular, from firms’ SEC filings I collected data both on cross-license agree-
ments and on patent litigation and from the NBER patent data file, I obtained infor-
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mation on firms’ patent portfolios. In addition, from Compustat, I collected data on
relevant financial variables for the semiconductor firms in the sample. Following Hall
and Ziedonis (2001) and Ziedonis (2004), I measure the specificity of firms’ technology
with firms’ capital intensity.
To control for the effects of product market competition and technological similar-
ity, I constructed four different distance measures. First, following Bloom, Schanker-
man and Van Reenen (2005), I empirically computed firm distances in technology
space using information on the distribution of their patenting across technological
areas. Second, using information on patent citations, I estimated an index of tech-
nological linkages across firms. Finally, collecting data from firm catalogues and firm
sales I constructed two measures of firm similarity in the product market space.
Constructing all possible pairings among firms in the sample, I observe that for
various pairings there is neither litigation nor cross-licensing. Nevertheless, among
pairings disclosing interaction, I notice all three patterns predicted by the theoretical
model: some parings resolved their disputes litigating and not cross-licensing, some
cross-licensing without litigation and some delaying cross-licensing with a period of
patent litigation.
To identify the impact of capital intensity on the choice of dispute resolution
technique and to address the concern that the probability of interaction among firms
may be non-random, I adopt a two-stage econometric model. First, I analyze what
variables determine the probability of observing firm interactions. In the second stage,
exploiting these results, I estimate the determinants of the cross-licensing outcome.
The main empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical model and can
be summarized as follows. First, interaction among firms is strongly related to their
location in the technology space: the probability to observe either patent litigation
or cross-license agreements is higher for firms closer in the technology space and this
probability increases with firms’ patent portfolios. Second, once I correct for the
probability of observing interactions, both the sorting between cross-license and liti-
gation and the timing of the agreement depend uniquely on firms’ capital intensities.
In particular, as the model predicts, I found that where firms’ capital intensity is
higher their incentive to litigate and delay a cross-license agreement is lower.
After having tested the empirical predictions of the model, I exploit the dataset
to conduct a simple policy exercise. More precisely, I study the potential effects of a
patent litigation reform as the one recently requested by a coalition of leading technol-
ogy companies. Because of the skewed capital intensity distribution of semiconductor
firms, I find that a reform may induce a substantial reduction in the number of broad
cross-license agreements.
This paper is connected to various strands of literature. Grindley and Teece
(1997) provide a collection of case studies about cross-licensing in semiconductors and
electronics. Most of the insights from their analysis of firms practice are captured
in my model and its predictions. More specifically, my theoretical model extends
the bargaining game of Yildiz (2003, 2004) introducing a per-period outside option
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borrowed from patent litigation models as those in Lanjouw and Lerner (1998, 2001)
and Marjit and alt.(2001).
A different theoretical analysis of patent cross-licensing is in Fershtman and Kamien
(1992). While the goal of their paper is to study how R&D investment may be altered
with cross-licensing, the focus of this paper is to analyze how firms choose to resolve
their disputes assuming a constant innovation pace.
Empirically, my analysis complements the results obtained by the patent litigation
literature (Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001, 2004) and Ziedonis (2003)). In fact,
combining patent litigation data with cross-license agreements, I obtain new insights
into semiconductor firms’ strategic interactions. Moreover my paper complements
Siebert and von Graevenitz (2005) empirical analysis of licensing in the semiconductor
industry. In their paper they study how technological and product market similarity
affect firms incentive to license their intellectual property. In their analysis the authors
do not distinguish between broad cross-licensing and simple patent licensing and they
drop from their dataset contracts related to patent litigation.
The general model is somewhat involved and so to gain intuition, I introduce in
section 2 a simple two period example that highlights the main trade-offs leading to
the central result. Section 3 discusses the infinite horizon bargaining model. The
dataset and its summary statistics are presented in section 4. Section 5 describes
the main results of the econometric analysis and section 6 discusses their policy
implication. Section 7 concludes.
2 An Illustrative Example
In this section, I present a simple example that shows how asset specificity may shape
firms’ incentives to cross-license their intellectual property. Moreover, this example
illustrates how firms with low or high levels of sunk costs tend to choose efficiently
between litigation and cross-license and how firms with intermediate values of specific
technology are inclined to be involved in inefficient litigation.
Consider a two period bargaining game between two semiconductor firms N =
{1, 2}. In each period the two firms are involved in a patent infringement dispute.
Each dispute arises because of a period specific innovation embedded in a product
that grants a total revenue of V and entails a production cost of F .
In the absence of a cross-license agreement the two firms solve the dispute by
litigation incurring a per-firm legal cost of L. I assume that the court will find the
disputed patent not infringed in half of the cases. In this event the two firms will
share the market and enjoy a duopolistic profit of V/2−F . Conversely, if the patent
is found to be infringed then the patentee will enjoy a monopoly profit of V −F and
the infringer will have to shut production down. In this case the infringing firm will
sustain a cost that varies with its investment in specific technology. More precisely,
I indicate this cost as kF where k ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter capturing the specificity
of firm assets. This cost arises because the hold-up problem is more serious for
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firms with large investments in specific technology that either cannot be used if the
production cannot take place, or are costly diverted to other activities. I provide
further justifications for this modeling assumption in section 3.3.
In this setting, the patentee expected payoff can be written as:
u =
1
2
(V − F ) +
1
2
(
V
2
− F )− L. (1)
Conversely, the expected payoff for the infringer is:
u(k) =
1
2
(
V
2
− F )−
1
2
kF − L. (2)
The two firms bargain upon a cross-license agreement. More specifically, at each
period the patentee offers the infringer a cross-license contract. In this contract the
two firms commit not to litigate present and future intellectual property disputes. In
addition, the agreement specifies a monetary transfer between the two parties.
I assume that firm 1 is the patentee in the first period and that the identity
of the second period infringer is stochastic. Each firm has a prior belief about the
probability of being the second period patentee: firm 1 believes it will be patentee
with probability p1 and firm 2 believes it will be patentee with probability p2. This
belief structure is assumed to be common knowledge.
I define p1 + p2 = 1 + y where y > 0 denotes the level of aggregate optimism.
Moreover, I assume the following parameter restriction:
V
2
> F > 4L. (3)
Timing is as follows.
Period 1: firm 1 makes a cross-license take it or leave it offer to firm 2. If firm
2 accepts the offer, the game ends and the firms split present and future duopolistic
payoffs according to the contract. If firm 2 refuses, the dispute is resolved by litigation.
Period 2: nature recognizes the second period patentee. The chosen firm makes
a cross-license take it or leave it offer to the infringer. Litigation occurs in the case
of rejection.
I solve the game by backward induction. It is easy to see that a cross-license
agreement is possible only if V −2F ≥ u+u(k) that occurs only if k ≥ 1−4L/F ≡ k.
In fact, if k < k then the payoff that parties obtain litigating exceeds the payoff
they can get with a cross-license agreement and therefore they will never cross-license
their intellectual property.
If k ≥ k, and there is no agreement in the first period, firm 2 second period
payoff is going to be V − 2F − u (k) if it makes the offer or u(k) if firm 1 is the
patentee.4 Therefore, the first period offer of firm 1 that will make firm 2 indifferent
between accepting or rejecting a cross-license is:
4The main prediction of the example continues to be valid if I constrain parties to litigate in the
second period.
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t = u(k) + p2(V − 2F − u(k)) + (1− p2)u(k)
= 2u(k) + p2(V − 2F − 2u(k)).
This offer is going to be profitable for firm 1 if and only if:
2(V − 2F )− 2u(k)− p2(V − 2F − 2u(k)) ≥ u+ u(k) + p1(V − 2F − 2u(k))
or
V − 2F − 2u(k) + V − 2F − u− u(k) ≥ (1 + y)(V − 2F − 2u(k))
V − 2F − u− u(k)
V − 2F − 2u(k)
≥ y
y(k) ≡
2L−
F
2
(1− k)
V
2
− F (1− k) + 2L
≥ y
where the formula for y(k) is obtained by replacing the litigation payoffs with
their definitions.
The result obtained shows that firms are going to delay the cross-license agreement
if the aggregate optimism is larger than a threshold y(k). The fact that bargaining
delay can be caused by excessive optimism due to the lack of common prior is not
a novel result. In fact, my example is very similar to two period negotiation models
proposed by legal scholars (see for example Landes (1971), Posner (1972) and Babcock
and Loewenstein (1997)) to explain how “divergent expectations” can cause failure
to settle.
What differentiates my simple example from previous literature is that in my
setting it is possible to notice that the level of optimism required to delay a broad
cross-license is increasing in k, that is:
sgn
{
dy(k)
dk
}
= sgn {V − 4L} > 0.
This result implies an equilibrium pattern similar to the one depicted in figure 1.
In this figure it is possible to notice that, given an initial value of optimism y, there
is not going to be agreement if k ≤ k and there is going to be immediate agreement
if k exceeds a threshold k∗.
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y(k)
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Delay Immediate 
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Litigation
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Figure 1: Asset Specificity and Equilibrium
More interestingly, inefficiencies arise for intermediate levels of sunk costs. In
fact, if k ≤ k ≤ k∗, despite both firms know that with an immediate cross-license
agreement they can increase their joint surplus, they prefer to delay the agreement
of one period. The reason for this delay is that, because of optimism, the share of
surplus that firm 2 requires in order to accept the contract is considered excessive by
firm 1. In this case, firm 1 prefers to wait one period, to let optimism disappear, and
to obtain a larger expected share of future surplus. As k increases, the cost sustained
by firm 2 in case of delay gets larger; this reduces its requested share of surplus and
allows firm 1 to offer an immediately acceptable contract.
3 The General Bargaining Game
The above example illustrates how investment in specific technology not only plays
a fundamental role in determining whether or not two firms will cross-license their
intellectual property, but also influences the timing of the agreement.
However, this simple example, though suggestive, has some limitations. First of
all, as Yildiz (2003) points out, the presence of delay relies critically on the assumption
that there are only two periods. In particular, it is possible to show that if optimism
is sufficiently persistent and the horizon of the game is long enough, then firms will
agree immediately. The intuition for this result is quite simple: with persistent
optimism and sufficiently long horizon, firms will anticipate that in the case of initial
disagreement there is going to be a very long delay and they will prefer to agree
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immediately.
Second, excessive optimism alone seems inadequate to explain cross-licensing delay
in the semiconductor industry. A more appealing justification for this delay would
involve some learning by firms during patent litigation.
Third, in the former example I assumed that moving from a monopoly to a
duopolistic market structure there was no revenue dissipation. Removing this as-
sumption can help understanding how product market competition may affect cross-
licensing.
In this section, to address these concerns, I generalize the example developing an
infinite horizon model of bargaining with learning. The model combines a litigation
framework similar to the one in Lanjouw and Lerner (2001) with the bargaining
game with learning developed in Yildiz (2003, 2004). In particular, I extend Yildiz
(2004) framework in two directions: first, in my model firms bargain over the surplus
generated by a cross-license agreement and not over a pie of fixed size, second, in
case of disagreement firms get a per-period outside option that correspond to their
litigation payoff.
3.1 Framework
As in the previous example, I consider a setting with two semiconductor firms N =
{1, 2} but I generalize the model to study an infinite stream of innovations. Each
innovation is going to be embedded in a product at a cost of F , it gives revenue for one
period only and then is exogenously replaced by a new innovation. In each period
nature recognizes one of the two firms as a patentee-producer facing an infringing
action on the part of the other firm (the infringer). The profits for the patentee if it
is the unique user of the innovation are V − F . If infringer and patentee both use
the innovation each of them obtains a profit of αV/2−F where the parameter α ≤ 1
captures the level of product market competition. In the absence of a cross-license
agreement the patentee goes to trial. In this case both players will have to pay a legal
cost L and I assume that with probability 1/2 the patent is found to be infringed and
with probability 1/2 it is not.
Therefore the patentee expected payoff from the period litigation is
u =
1
2
(V − F ) +
1
2
(
αV
2
− F )− L (4)
whereas the expected payoff for the infringer is:
u(k) =
1
2
(
αV
2
− F )−
1
2
kF − L (5)
where k ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter indicating firm investment in specific assets.
Firms discount future with a discount factor δ < 1. I assume that in each period
firm 1 is chosen to be the patentee with probability ρ and firm 2 is chosen to be the
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patentee with probability 1− ρ. Following Yildiz (2003), I assume that firms do not
know ρ and they have two different priors about it. It is possible to interpret this
difference in beliefs about nature recognition process as a difference in beliefs about
each player’s bargaining power. In fact, because in sequential offer bargaining mod-
els a player’s bargaining power is eventually determined by the recognition process,
the latter can be used to metaphorically describe the former. This relation between
relative offer frequencies and bargaining power have been previously noted by Bin-
more et al. (1986) exploring the relationship between the Rubinstein noncooperative
bargaining game and the weighted Nash bargaining solution. In addition, two results
in Yildiz (2004) confirm that this intuition is adequate in my model: first a firm’s
equilibrium payoff is the present value of all rents it expects to extract when it offers
in the future, second a firm i becomes better off in equilibrium whenever each player
comes to believe that i has higher probability of recognition in the future.
I consider the following timing. At t = 1 nature recognizes the first period paten-
tee. The two firms observe this selection and update their beliefs. The chosen patentee
offers to the infringer a share of present and future duopolistic profits. If the infringer
accepts this offer the game ends and the firms enjoy the stream of future duopolis-
tic profits according to the share proposed by the patentee. If it rejects they both
receive the litigation payoffs for one period and nature selects who is going to make
the offer in the following period. Firms observe who is chosen, update their beliefs
and the game proceeds for an infinite horizon. The actual game tree is specified in
the following figure 2.
To solve this infinite horizon bargaining game I need to assume some restrictions
on players’ beliefs. Following Yildiz (2003) I assume that they have beta distributions.
Fixing any positive integers m1, m2 and n with 1 ≤ m2 ≤ m1 ≤ n− 2, I assume that
for any given dates t and s with s ≥ t, at the beginning of date t if a firm i observes
that firm 1 has made m offers (and firm 2 has made t − m offers), then it assigns
probability
mi +m
t+ n
to the event that firm 1 will make an offer at date s.
This belief structure arises when each player believes that the probability of firm 1
making an offer at any date t is identically and independently distributed with some
unknown parameter ρ that is distributed with a beta distribution with parameters
mi and n. As Yildiz (2004), I assume that everything about this beliefs structure is
common knowledge.
Write pit(m) for the probability firm i assigns at (m, t) to the event that it will
offer at any date s ≥ t. Now, each firm i thinks at (m, t) that the probability that
the other firm j will offer at date s is 1− pit(m) while firm j thinks that it will offer
with probability pjt(m) which is higher than 1 − p
i
t(m) as I will show shortly. This
difference indicates that player i thinks that j is optimistic. Since each player thinks
that the other player is optimistic, following Yildiz (2004), I will say that the players
11
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are optimistic at (m, t).
I define
yt(m) = p
1
t (m) + p
2
t (m)− 1
the level of aggregate optimism at (m, t). Because of the beta distribution that
has been assumed:
yt(m) =
m1 −m2
t+ n
=
∆
t+ n
> 0.
The previous formula has three important implications. First, since yt(m) > 0,
the players are indeed optimistic at each (m, t). Second, yt is deterministic: it does
not depend on m and therefore it is possible to suppress m from the notation. This is
due to the assumption that n is the same in both distributions and it greatly simplifies
the analysis. Third, as t gets larger, firms’ beliefs converge and firms learn the actual
ρ.
Finally, I assume the following parameter restriction:
αV
2
> F > 4L. (6)
The first inequality is necessary to have positive duopolistic profits and both
firms producing in the case of invalid patent. The second inequality implies an upper
bound to litigation costs. In particular, combining the two inequalities, total legal
costs (2L) cannot exceed one-quarter of the total duopolistic revenue and this is in
line with standard assumptions in the patent litigation literature (see Lanjouw and
Lerner (1998)).
3.2 Testable Predictions
To understand the effects of firm sunk costs, consider the per-period surplus. If a
cross-license agreement is reached both firms produce and sell the product and the
total per-period surplus is going to be αV − 2F . Conversely, if litigation occurs then
total per-period surplus depends on the court decision and in expectation is given by:
u+ u(k) =
1
2
(V − F − kF ) +
1
2
(αV − 2F )− 2L.
It is easy to see that αV −2F > u+u(k) only if k > 1−4L/F +V (1−α)/F ≡ k
i.e. a cross-license agreement is efficient only for large values of asset specificity. This
threshold implies that in a model without optimism there will be a discontinuity in
the outcome of a cross-license bargaining game. In fact, whereas in the inefficient
region (k ≤ k) firms will never agree on a cross-license, for k > k there will be
immediate agreement.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Outcomes
Introducing optimism may remove this discontinuity in the outcome of the bar-
gaining game. In particular, in the case in which a cross-license is efficient, an agree-
ment may be reached with delay. The following proposition characterizes the unique
Markov perfect equilibrium of this infinite horizon game in which player strategies
only depend on how many times firm 1 has been recognized.
Proposition 1 For k ≤ k litigation is efficient and a cross-license agreement never
occurs. For k > k players sign a cross license-agreement. For any ∆, n there exist
δ̂ and k∗ such that:
1. for δ ≥ δ̂ there is always agreement with delay
2. for δ < δ̂ there exists a k∗ such that if k ≥ k∗ there is immediate agreement and
there is agreement with delay if k∗ > k > k.
Proof. See Appendix.
The content of the proposition is illustrated in figure 3. For low values of k the size
of the outside option is greater than the surplus that can be shared cross-licensing and
therefore there is never agreement. When k exceeds k, agreement becomes efficient
and can be reached with or without delay. In particular, there is immediate agreement
if δ is low and k is large.
The equilibrium timing for the agreement is determined by a trade-off between
the benefit and cost from waiting one period. As in Yildiz (2004), my bargaining
game is based on a tension between learning and the discount factor. On one side,
optimism induces both parties to delay the agreement because the overestimated bar-
gaining power renders expensive for the patentee to offer to the infringer its expected
continuation value. Because of learning, waiting one period will reduce infringer’s
requested share and will allow the patentee to obtain a better deal. On the other
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side, the discount factor reduces the value of future payoffs and induces parties to
agree immediately.
Differently from Yildiz (2004), my model considers additional variables that can
influence the agreement timing. In particular, asset specificity plays a fundamental
role in my bargaining game. More specifically, an increase in k has two effects. First,
it renders more costly for the infringer to reject an offer. This increases the rent
that the patentee can extract with an immediate agreement and induces the parties
to agree without delay. Second, it increases rents that future patentees will be able
to extract. This effect increases the marginal benefit of waiting (because optimism
is attached to larger rents) and induces parties to delay the agreement. For δ low
enough, the first effect dominates the second and an increase in sunk costs renders
more costly for the parties to delay the agreement.
3.3 Discussion of the Main Assumptions
The model builds on a number of assumptions which are worthy of additional discus-
sion.
First, in modeling infringer’s payoff I assumed that in the case of patent infringe-
ment it sustains a cost that increases with its investment in specific technology. The
fact that the cost associated with stopping production or varying production processes
increases with firm’ sunk costs has been already emphasized in the literature. In par-
ticular, Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and Ziedonis (2004) discuss field interviews in which
it clearly emerges how the losses due to halting or altering production processes are
more detrimental for firms investing intensively in product specific manufacture fa-
cilities. Also Shapiro (2001) points out that the hold-up problem is more serious for
manufacturers with large sunk costs. A micro-foundation of this cost can be easily
provided assuming that each innovation can be embedded in a product investing in
equipment that costs F and that a fraction k ≤ 1 of this cost is sunk. In this frame-
work, if the infringer has to halt its production, it can resell only the non-sunk part
of its equipment. In this setting, a larger k can be mapped into lower revenue from
reselling the equipment after halting production. As in my model for k large enough
cross-license is the efficient alternative.
Second, I assume that in negotiating a cross-license agreement the patentee makes
a take it or leave it offer that does not depend upon future recognition and quantity
produced. In particular, I do not consider more sophisticated licensing mechanisms
as those presented in Kamien and Tauman (1986, 2002) and in Katz and Shapiro
(1985). The main reason for this assumption is that in the data I did not find any
empirical evidence of royalties or price fixing. Moreover, antitrust guidelines for the
licensing of intellectual property specify that "when cross-licensing arrangements are
mechanisms to accomplish naked fixed pricing or market division, they are subject
to challenge under the per-se rule".5
5See Department of Justice (1995).
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Third, I assumed that in case of disagreement over a cross-license firms have
to resolve their period dispute by litigation. This assumption greatly simplify my
analysis but it can be removed. If I replace litigation with private settlement, results
keep being valid as long as firms have to sustain a cost l < L in order to reach the
settlement. In addition, I can assume that private settlement is costless introducing
some informational asymmetry over the patent infringement (as in Bebchuck (1984))
that might lead with some positive probability to parties’ failure to settle. Also in
this case the main results will still be valid.
As Yildiz (2004) points out, it is important to notice that there is no inconsistency
in combining rationality assumptions with heterogeneous prior beliefs. In fact Savage
(1954) discusses how these assumptions are not related and Morris (1995) shows that
rationality arguments in favour of the common prior assumption are rather weak. My
paper contributes to a strand of growing literature of applied theory that shows how
it is possible to obtain precious insights relaxing the common prior assumption.6
Finally I discuss the choice of Yildiz (2004) bargaining framework. There are
various theoretical papers analyzing how delay in bargaining can be obtained from
different mechanisms. Kennan andWilson (1993) review the literature in which delays
arise because of the presence of private information. In fact, private information can
induce delay due to signaling, screening or attrition purposes. Additionally, delay
can be generated in games with simultaneous offers as Perry and Reny (1993), in
models with more than two players as Cai (2000) or introducing transaction costs as
in Anderlini and Felli (2001). Among all these mechanism I adopted Yildiz (2004)
framework because it allows to generate delay due to parties’ willingness to learn
their pattern of future infringements. Managerial literature has pointed out how
relevant this feature is in semiconductor cross-license negotiation (see for instance the
Texas Instrument case study in Grindley and Teece (1997)). In fact, this literature
describes how delay in these negotiations are often generated because of extensive
reverse engineering that parties carry out in order to evaluate their dependence upon
counterpart intellectual property.
4 Data
Following Hall and Ziedonis (2001), I identified from Compustat the universe of pub-
licly traded U.S. firms whose principal line of business is semiconductor and related
devices (SIC 3674) and that have data from 1998 to 2003. I then matched these firms
with data of the NBER Patent Data file obtaining information on patent activity of
these firms from 1963 to 2002. I restricted the dataset to firms having some patenting
activity after 1988 and I obtained a sample of 95 companies.
For all these 95 firms, I collected information both on their cross-license agree-
6Among the various contributions see Watanabe (2005) and Roth (1996) for industrial organiza-
tion settings and Morris (1994) or Harrison and Kreps (1978) for financial market applications.
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ments and on their patent litigation from the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission
fillings that these companies filed for the period 1994-2004. Examining these doc-
uments, I identified 24 broad cross-license contracts. More precisely, I defined an
agreement as a "broad cross-license" if either firms cross-licensed their entire patent
portfolios (20/24 agreements) or they cross-licensed patents in some extensive tech-
nology group (e.g. memory devices). The detail of information disclosed varies across
firms: some filings indicate only the existence of the contract others are more accurate
disclosing terms and financial conditions.7
Only 25 of the 95 firms in the sample are involved in cross-license agreements.
Nevertheless these firms carry out 84.29% of the patent activity in the sector during
the period 1998-2002. In addition, I found that the links created by cross-license
agreements between firms are not completely random. Firms appear to be orga-
nized into two well defined star networks one with centre on Texas Instruments Inc.
and another one with a core formed by four companies: Intel Corporation, Broad-
com Corporation, National Semiconductor Corporation and Agere Systems Guardian
Corporation.
In addition, from the SEC filings, I obtained data on patent litigation among
firms in the sample for the period 1994-2004 . I define patent litigation as an un-
interrupted period of patent dispute between two companies, independently of the
identity of the infringer and the number of sues and counter-sues. I registered 38
cases of patent litigation among firm pairs in the sample.
For each company I computed the patent portfolio as the sum of patents obtained
by the company from 1988 to 2002.8 Moreover, for all firm pairings I measured the
asymmetry between the two portfolios computing the ratio between the larger and
the smaller. In addition, for each firm I measure its patent intensity as the ratio
of its portfolio and the number of its employees.
To measure product market distance I used two distinct measures. The first
is based on the World Semiconductor Trade Statistics (WSTS) "Blue Book" report.
The WSTS is a non profit corporation providing data collection on semiconductor
trade. From this publication I identified 23 broad product categories. Combining this
information with data obtained from firm catalogs I constructed for each firm a vector
si = (0, 1, 0, ..., 0) where the jth entry is 1 if firm i is selling some product in category
j. With these vectors I computed the SIC distance as in Bloom, Schankerman and
7As an example we report an extract from the Form 10-K deposited by Micrel Inc. describing
its agreement with National Semiconductor Corporation:“On May 23, 2002, the Company entered
into a Patent Cross License and Settlement Agreement with National Semiconductor which settled all
outstanding patent disputes between the companies and cross licensed the entire patent portfolio
of each company. Some of the National patents within certain field of use areas are licensed for
the life of the patents, all other patents of both companies are licensed through May 22, 2009. Under
the terms of the agreement Micrel agreed to pay National $9.0 million.”
8To construct the portfolios we considered the patents directly obtained by the company and
those obtained by firms merged or aquired by the company in the period 1988-2002.
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Van Reenen (2005) (henceforth BSV):
SICij =
s′isj
(s′isi)
1
2 (s′jsj)
1
2
.
Secondly, I exploited the very same data used in the BSV paper. I obtained sales
of the firms in seven 4-digit SIC codes lines of business and I computed the average
share of sales per line of business within each firm over the period 1993-2000. I let
Si = (Si1, ...Si7) denote the distribution of sales of firm i across SIC codes. Following
BSV, I computed theBSVSIC as the uncentered correlation across all firms pairings:
BSV SICij =
S ′iSj
(S′iSi)
1
2 (S ′jSj)
1
2
.
The two product market distances presented are both imperfect measures of sim-
ilarity among firms manufactured goods. In particular SIC is quite detailed but it
does not consider the relative importance of a product class on firms revenue. Con-
versely BSVSIC gives different weights to different product categories according to
their impact on company sales but it is based only on seven broad SIC codes.
The technological correlation is measured using the 426 technology classes
(N-classes) provided by the USPTO. Following Jaffe (1986, 1988) and BSV (2005) I
used the average share of patents per firm in each technology class over the period
1988-2002 to construct the vector ti = (ti1, ti2, ..., ti426) describing the distribution of
patents of firm i across technological classes. The technological closeness measure
TECH is calculated as the uncentered correlation between all firms pairings:
TECHij =
t′itj
(t′iti)
1
2 (t′jtj)
1
2
.
In addition, I constructed a measure of linkages between firms using the NBER
Citation Data file. For each firm pair ij I computed the fraction of firm i citations
that referred to firm j patents and the fraction of firm j citations referring to firm
i patents. I averaged these two values weighting them with firms total number of
citations. More formally my index is:
LINKij =
# citations from i to j +# citations from j to i
# citations of i+# citations of j
.
It is important to note how the LINK measure differs from the TECH mea-
sure. TECH quantifies the proximity between two firm research activities in the
426-dimensional space generated by the USPTO N-classes. A large value for TECH
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implies that the portfolios of the two firms are very similar and can be interpreted as
a proxy of substitutability between patents in the two portfolios. Conversely LINK
measures direct linkages between the two firms. A value of LINK close to one implies
that most of firm i research activities rely on firm j patents and therefore can be
interpreted as an evidence of complementarity between the two portfolios.
To capture firm asset specificity, I adopt two alternative measures. First, as Hall
and Ziedonis (2001), I use capital intensity defined as the ratio of plant and equipment
to employees of each firm in year 2002.
In particular, for each firm pairing I compute the average of the two firms’ capital
intensities. In addition, to consider the asymmetries between the two capital inten-
sities I computed the ratio (max/min) between the indexes. Both average capital
intensity and the capital intensity ratio have been calculated for the gross figure of
property plant and equipment and for the net figure ( i.e. subtracting accumulated
depreciation).
Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and Ziedonis (2003, 2004) provide various justifications
for the use of this capital-labor ratio as a proxy for the cost involved with halting
production. In particular, from their field interviews and their analysis of data from
the Integrated Circuit Engineering Corporation, Hall and Ziedonis (2001) observed
that in the semiconductor industry this capital intensity measure appears to be highly
correlated with sunk costs. Moreover, Hall and Ziedonis (2001) argue that fabrication
facility expected life span has significantly decreased during the nineties, making
these investments more and more product specific. In addition they illustrate that
the cost of equipment needed for a new semiconductor fabrication plant is very large
(in 1998 it was estimated as more than $1.5 billion) and that it has increased (and
is expected to keep increasing) over time, rendering equipment and machinery the
largest component in the plant and equipment figure.
As additional measure, I developed an alternative sunkness index based on firms’
technological information. In particular, exploiting information obtained from firms’
product catalogues and SEC filings, I classified firms according to four product cat-
egories they produce: microprocessor chips (group 3), memory chips (group 2), pro-
grammable logic (group 1) and others (group 0). Literature on the semiconductor
industry (e.g. Turley (2005)) points out how the sunkness of the equipment tends to
decrease as we move from products in group 0 to products in group 39. As for the
capital intensity measure, for each firm pair I computed the average between firms’
sunkness indexes.
The unit of observation in the empirical analysis is going to be a firm pair. In
particular, using the 95 firms in the sample, I constructed a data set of 4465 pairings
(95× 94/2).
In table 1, I present some summary statistics for the various variables across
pairings in the dataset. Total Portfolio indicates the sum of the two portfolios whereas
9From an email exchange with Texas Instruments engineers I obtained additional support to this
classification.
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Portfolio Ratio indicates the ratio between the greater and the smaller portfolio in
the pair. Similarly, Average Capital Intensity indicates the average between the
two firm capital intensity indexes and Capital Intensity Ratio indicates the ratio
of the maximum over the minimum. Table 1 also provides summary statistics for
the four measures of technological similarity and product market closeness. The
values obtained are similar to those obtained by Ornaghi (2005) for a sample of
pharmaceutical firms. It is important to note the difference in the distribution of the
two measures of product market similarity. The SIC measure, because of its greater
detail, appears highly skewed to the left (its median is zero) whereas BSVSIC emerges
as highly skewed to the right (its median is 0.707).
The correlation among the four distance measures is presented in table 2. The
correlation between product market and technological distances appears quite low.
In particular, it is lower than the one obtained in BSV but in line with the values ob-
tained by Ornaghi (2005). As discussed above, both SIC and BSVSIC are unsatisfac-
tory measures of firm product differentiation. Their imperfection is straightforwardly
observed from the very low correlation between them.
Across these pairings, I identified those having disclosed cross-license agreements
or patent litigation. Examining the information I collected from firm SEC filings, it
is possible to observe that for only one percent of the firm parings there is some form
of interaction. Interestingly, all three patterns predicted by the theoretical model
emerge from the data:
1. for 22 pairings, firms litigated and terminated the litigation (either with a trial
judgment or with a private settlement) without signing a cross-license agree-
ment;
2. for 16 pairings, firms litigated and terminated the litigation with a settlement
involving a cross-license agreement;
3. for 8 pairings, firms signed a cross-license agreement without previous litigation.
The fact that for most of the pairings I register neither litigation nor cross-license
is a relevant aspect of the data and will play an important role in the econometric
analysis.
I define now the dummy variable CONTACT. I let this variable take value equal to
one if there is evidence of either litigation or cross-license between firms in a pairing.
As I discussed above, CONTACT is zero for 4419 pairings and one for 46 pairings
only. In table 3, exploiting this dummy, I compare variable means of firm pairings
for which I register interaction and with those of pairings for which I do not observe
it.
At a first look, firm pairings involved in litigation or cross-licensing appear to have
a greater total portfolio, larger size and greater average patent intensity. In addition,
they seem closer both in the technology space and in the product market dimension.
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Moreover firm technological linkages look much stronger among firms with a positive
value for CONTACT.
In table 4, I look more in detail to pairings disclosing some form of interaction.
More precisely, in this table I classify firm pairings according to the way they resolved
their patent disputes. Specifically, in the first column of table 4 I report averages for
firm pairings involved in litigation only, in the second column for those litigating
and then cross-licensing and in the third column for those cross-licensing without
litigation.
Performing a one-way ANOVA test, I notice that the only variables that appear
statistically different across the three groups are those related to firm capital intensi-
ties. Therefore, from the analysis of these summary statistics I conclude that whereas
there are a number of variables correlated with the likelihood of observing a dispute
between two firms, the actual choice of the dispute resolution technique appears only
correlated with firms’ capital intensity and not with other variables.
In particular, consistently with the model, the first look at the figures suggests
that firms pairings with low average capital intensity tend to litigate without signing
a cross-license agreement, that those with intermediate average capital intensity tend
to litigate before cross-licensing and, finally, that those with high average capital
intensity are inclined to cross-license immediately. In the next section I am going
to evaluate whether the impressions from these summary statistics carry over to a
formal econometric analysis.
5 Econometrics
In this section I describe the econometric techniques I adopt to analyze firm choices
between cross-licensing and litigating. To this end I introduce a new ordered variable
that I label OUTCOME. This variable is taking value of 1 if there is litigation without
cross-licensing, value of 2 if litigation has concluded with a cross-license agreement
and finally it is equal to 3 if there is agreement without any previous litigation. More
precisely, I consider OUTCOME as an ordered variable in the sense that its three
values correspond to decreasing willingness to delay a cross-license agreement. In
particular, I assume it varies according to a latent variable y∗2ij (to be interpreted as
impatience to cross-license) in the following way:
OUTCOMEij =


1 if y∗2ij < c1
2 if c1 < y
∗
2ij < c2
3 if y∗2ij > c2
and
y∗2ij = x
′
2ijβ2 + u2ij,
where x2ij and β2 denote the vectors of explanatory variables and parameters
and u2ij is the error term. I set OUTCOMEij equal to zero if no dispute is observed
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between i and j.
There is a problem in estimating this ordered probit model and it is the fact
that the probability of observing a dispute about intellectual property can depend
upon variables that are different from those affecting the dispute resolution tech-
nique. Figure 5 describes this nested aspect that I have to consider in estimating the
determinants of cross-licensing.
Contact
No
Yes
Litigation Only
Litigation + 
Cross License
Cross License Only
Ordered 
Probit
FIGURE 5: Nested Aspect of Disputes
For this reason, following Amemiya (1984), I use a Type II Tobit model where the
probability of observing a dispute is captured by the dichotomous variable CONTACT
that varies according to the value of a latent response variable y∗1ij in such a way that:
CONTACTij =
{
1 if y∗1ij > 0
0 if y∗1ij < 0
where
y∗1ij = x
′
1ijβ1 + u1ij ij = 1, ..., n(n− 1)/2 (7)
and x1ij and β1 denote the vectors of explanatory variables and parameters and
u1ij is the error term. I assume that {u1ij, u2ij} are i.i.d. drawings from a bivariate
standard normal distribution with correlation coefficient ρ.
In this setting Amemiya (1984) shows that:
E[y∗2ij|x2ij ] = x
′
2ijβ2 + E[u2ij|CONTACTij > 0 ] (8)
= x′2ijβ2 + E[u2ij| u1ij > −x
′
1ijβ1]
= x′2ijβ2 + ρ
φ(x′1ijβ1)
Φ(x′1ijβ1)
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where φ(.) is the standard normal density and Φ(.) its cumulative distribution
function. It is therefore easy to see why the estimation of (8) may be biased whenever
ρ is not zero.
To correct for this bias, and following Van De Ven and Van Praag (1981), I
construct a likelihood function based on equations (7) and (8):
L =
∏
CONTACT=0
P ( y∗1 ≤ 0)
∏
OUTCOME=1
P ( y∗2 < c1 ∧ y
∗
1 > 0)∏
OUTCOME=2
P ( c1 < y
∗
2 < c2 ∧ y
∗
1 > 0)
∏
OUTCOME=3
P ( c2 < y
∗
2 ∧ y
∗
1 > 0).
Given the assumptions on the distribution of {u1ij, u2ij} it is possible to express
this likelihood function in terms of cumulative normal distributions, I describe how to
derive this formula in the appendix. It is interesting to note how the first part of this
likelihood resembles the likelihood for a conventional probit, whereas the second part
resembles the ordered probit on those sample points that have a positive OUTCOME
value.
5.1 Discussion
I begin the empirical investigation analyzing the determinants of firm interactions. To
this end, I estimated the probability of CONTACT with various probit regressions.
As described in section 4, I assign a positive value to this dummy variable if a firm
paring discloses either litigation or cross-licensing. Results for these regressions are
reported in table 5. The main outcome of these estimations (and of others not
reported) is captured by the first column of the table: the probability of observing
some form of CONTACT between two firms depends on their technological closeness,
on the linkages between them and on the size of firm portfolios. In fact total portfolio,
TECH and LINK are the only variables that show up significant at the 0.01 level.
Significance of these variables persists when I introduce additional controls and
nonlinear effects. For example, in column (2) I show that there is no evidence of
quadratic effects for total portfolio. Similarly, in non reported regressions, I observed
that analogous non-linear effects do not show up for TECH and LINK. In addition,
I do not find significance for interactions between LINK, TECH and total portfolio
(marginal effects computation follows Ali and Norton (2003)).
In columns (3) and (4) I show that the measures of product market similarity, and
the index of sunkeness do not seem related to the probability of interaction. Finally,
in column (5), I show that capital intensity, employment and patent intensity do
not affect the probability of interaction.
In all estimations, the effect of the TECH variable appears to be stronger than
the one of the LINK measure. In fact the marginal effect for TECH is 0.018 and its
correspondent elasticity at the mean is 0.82 whereas for LINK the marginal effect
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is 0.004 and the elasticity is 0.003. More precisely, whereas a one standard devia-
tion increase of TECH raises the probability of interaction of 0.004, a one standard
deviation increase in LINK raises this probability of 0.0001 only.
The marginal effect of total portfolio is positive and its elasticity at the mean is
0.22. As it is possible to observe from table 6, if the values of TECH an LINK are
kept constant at their means, the marginal effect of total portfolio does not seem to
vary across its distribution. In fact both for the total portfolio median paring (133
patents) and for the 90th percentile pairing (2173 patents) an increase of 100 patents
raises the probability of interaction of 0.0001.
For simplicity, in the theoretical model I assumed that the infringement disputes
were arising exogenously in each period. The constant total portfolio marginal effect
offers some indication on how it can be possible to extend the model introducing a
probability of infringement that depends linearly on firm total portfolio. Consider
the following simple example: there are 2 firms A and B with nA and nB patents
respectively. Let us assume that each patent of firm A is infringed by firm B with
probability α, that each patent of firm B is infringed by firm A with probability
α and these probabilities are i.i.d. across patents and firms. Then firm A will not
infringe any patent of firm B with probability (1− α)nB and similarly firm B will
not infringe with probability (1− α)nA. Therefore at least one infringement will arise
with probability 1 − (1− α)nA ∗ (1− α)nB = 1 − (1− α)nA+ nB ≃ (nA + nB)α for
α low enough that is linear in nA + nB. Therefore, combining this simple example
with the empirical finding, I conclude that it is plausible to assume each patent to be
infringed with a constant and independently drawn small probability.10
Exploiting these probit regressions, I performed various ordered probit estimations
correcting for the selection bias.
Results for some of these regressions are reported in table 7. For these regressions,
the identification strategy is to assume that TECH does influence the probability of
observing a dispute but it does not influence the choice of dispute resolution technique.
In unreported regressions, I tested various alternative identification strategies. In
most of the regression performed, correlation between the two error terms is not
10At a first sight, this constant marginal effect appears in contrast with the estimates in Lanjouw
and Schankerman (2004). In fact, in a sample of 17,443 patents in eight broad technology groups,
they show that patent litigation probability is negatively related to the size of firm patent portfolio.
To understand the divergence between the two estimates it is important to understand how their
empirical question differs from the one in this paper. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) compute the
litigation probability at a patent level, i.e. the likelihood that a randomly drawn patent in a portfolio
is litigated. Differently, in the probit regressions reported in table 5, I consider the probability of
interaction for a firm pairing. The setting is therefore different and, in particular, two features of the
data may help explaining the difference in the results. First, in considering interactions among firms,
I do not restrict the analysis to litigation but I also include cross-licensing. Second, a reduction of
the litigation probability at patent level does not necessarily reduce the litigation probability at firm
level, in fact this probability will increase as long as the portfolio elasticity is less than 1 in absolute
value. In Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) this elasticity is estimated (at means) to be 0.13, a
value that is consistent with the positive marginal effect reported in table 6.
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statistically significant and does not affect the main qualitative results. In particular,
the absence of selection bias carries over even when I include in both stages of the
regression the same vector of variables (see companion appendix for details).
Results in table 7 give empirical support to the testable predictions of the model.
In fact, the analysis shows that once we correct for the probability of observing some
form of interaction between two firms, their choice of dispute resolution technique
appears correlated only with variables linked to their asset specificity: average capital
intensity (in columns (1)-(3)) or average sunkness index in (column (4)).
In addition, the positive coefficients on these variables imply that, consistently
with the model, firm pairings with low average capital intensity tend to solve their
disputes litigating and not cross-licensing, firm pairings with intermediate values of
capital intensity tend to delay cross-license agreements and pairings with large average
capital intensity tend to cross-license avoiding litigation.
In columns (1) and (2) of table 7, I analyze the effects of product market re-
latedness. According to the theoretical model, it is reasonable to expect a negative
coefficient on the product market distance measures. The data only partially support
this result: the coefficients on both distances are never significant and always of the
wrong sign. Nevertheless, generating a dummy variable that takes value one if both
SIC and BSVSIC are above the 98th percentile, it is possible to notice that pairings
very close in the product market space tend not to enter in a broad cross-license
agreement. In fact, the coefficient of this dummy is negative and significant at the
5% level. (A more detailed analysis of the effects of both product market similarity
and firm asymmetry is provided in the companion appendix).
6 Policy Implications
In this section I discuss some policy implications that can be obtained from the
bargaining game.
The theoretical model unveils two types of patent litigation: efficient “perpet-
ual” litigation and inefficient “persuasive” litigation. Firms with low asset specificity
engage in “perpetual” litigation in the sense that they never reach a cross-license
agreement. This kind of litigation is efficient because the payoff that they obtain by
legally enforcing their intellectual property exceeds the payoff they would get from a
cross-license. On the other hand, firms with intermediate values of sunk costs engage
in “persuasive” litigation: they litigate in order to obtain a better deal in a cross-
license agreement. This second type of litigation is inefficient because the joint payoff
that parties would get by immediately signing a cross-license agreement does exceed
the one they obtain litigating.
The model shows that not distinguishing between these two categories may have a
serious impact on policy evaluation. More precisely, considering the amount of arising
disputes as exogenous, a policy leading to an increase in the amount of litigation has
to be evaluated differently depending on the type of litigation that it induces. In fact,
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whereas a policy leading to an increase of “perpetual” litigation increases firms joint
payoffs, a policy inducing an increase of “persuasive” litigation reduces firms surplus.
In the following, I consider a policy experiment that can impact on cross-license
decisions: a reduction in legal cost. More specifically, I model a reduction in legal
cost with a decrease in the parameter L.
The analysis of this policy exercise is valuable to evaluate new proposals of patent
litigation reform. In fact, various leading technology companies (including Intel, Cisco
System and Hewlett Packard) have recently formed a coalition to lobby for patent
litigation reform. While at present no formal list of members and policy goals has
been released, a press report of the president of this coalition (Douglas Comer, Intel’s
director of legal affairs and technology policy) states:
“We are interested in improving the way remedies are applied, the way
damages are assessed in the courts, and the function in the courts.”
Analyzing various press releases and Senate testimonies11 it appears that among
the various suggestions, there are three reforms that companies seem to find necessary
to restore fairness in the litigation system. First, to reduce the threat from patent
trolls: companies that exist primarily to extract money from patent litigation and
are exploiting the system to force lucrative settlements. Second, to eliminate forum
shopping: plaintiffs should not be permitted to funneling cases into courts more
predisposed to granting injunctions and defendants should not be able to target courts
with the opposite bias. Third, to allow for post-grant administrative reviews.
More precisely, the suggestion is to determine patent validity not through costly
civil litigation but through administrative experts or through members of a technical
agency.
If this lobby activity will reveal successful, and in particular if post-grant proceed-
ings will be allowed, it seems reasonable to expect that the increase in court efficiency
will lead to a reduction in firm litigation costs.
In my setting, a reduction in legal cost increases the total amount of litigation,
but its effect on welfare is ambiguous as next proposition describes.
Proposition 2 A decrease in L leads to an increase in k and in k∗.
Proof. See Appendix.
What this result shows is that a reduction in L, increasing the level of k∗, increases
the total amount of litigation. The shift in k is quite intuitive: there is an increase
in the surplus from litigation that reduces the region where cross-license is efficient.
Moreover, a reduction in legal cost reduces the cost of delay both for the infringer
and the patentee, shifting k∗ to the right. Figure 4 illustrates this finding.
11See in particular the testimony of Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President and General Counsel
of Cisco Systems, “Perspectives on Patents: Post-Grant Review Procedures and Other Litigation
Reforms” before the Senate Subcommittee on Intellectual Property on the Judiciary May 23, 2006.
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Figure 4: A Simple Policy Experiment
To evaluate the welfare impact of such an increase in total litigation, it is necessary
to compare two opposite effects. On one side there is a welfare gain because of an
increase in “perpetual” litigation due to a larger k. This implies that some firms
that before were sharing the duopoly surplus now are attaining a greater joint payoff
enforcing their intellectual property rights. On the other side there is a welfare loss
due to a shift in k∗. In fact, firms that before were immediately reaching a cross-
license agreement are now engaging in inefficient “persuasive” litigation.
While the relative strength of the two effects will depend on model’s parameters,
an important role in the computation of the welfare impact will be played by the
distribution of firms’ investments in specific technology. In particular, the proposition
implies that a reduction in legal costs is more likely to lead to inefficient litigation
whenever the number of firms signing immediate cross-license agreements is large
compared to those delaying the agreement.
The shift in k has a positive welfare impact: it implies that firms that previ-
ously were cross-licensing are now enforcing their intellectual property and therefore
attaining a higher payoff. Conversely the shift in k∗ has a negative impact on wel-
fare: it means that firms that previously were cross-licensing immediately are now
engaging in inefficient “persuasive” litigation and therefore attain a lower joint payoff.
Clearly, the total welfare impact of the policy comes from the combination of these
two effects. A precise computation of this welfare impact requires information on
firm litigation costs and is beyond the scope of this paper; nevertheless, the dataset
allows to evaluate the possible effects of the policy on the number of agreements in
the semiconductor industry.
In particular, analyzing the distribution of firms’ capital intensities, it is possible
to obtain some indication of the number of firms likely to be affected by these marginal
shifts.
Figure 5 plots the distributions of average capital intensities of all firm pairings for
which I register some form of interaction. The two red lines represent the estimated
thresholds that delimit the regions of litigation, delayed cross-license and immediate
cross-license (backed-up from the ordered probit in column(1) of table 7).
From this figure it is evident that the number of firms around the first cutoff is
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Figure 5: Capital Intensity Distribution and Litigation
much larger than the number of firms around the second. This implies that for many
pairings the relevant trade-off lies in the choice between cross-licensing or not cross-
licensing rather than in the choice between delaying the agreement or cross-license
immediately.
To have a sense of the magnitude of the skewness in the distribution of capital
intensity, I simulate a reduction in litigation costs leading to a right shift in both
thresholds of one standard deviation of the average capital intensity distribution. As
a consequence of this shift, I observe eight firm pairings switching from persuasive
to efficient litigation and only one pairing switching from immediate cross-license to
inefficient litigation.
From this simple exercise, I conclude that the number of firms expected to be
negatively affected by a reduction in litigation costs appears to be reasonably small
compared to the number of firms expected to be better off.
Therefore, whereas the bargaining game leads to an ambiguous prediction on the
change in the number of agreements, combining the theoretical intuition of the model
with some empirical figures I show it is possible to get an idea of the magnitude
of the two effects. In particular, it seems reasonable to exect the policy exercise to
lead to a reduction in the number of broad cross-license agreements that more than
compensate the possible surge in persuasive litigation.
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7 Conclusion
The existence of a patent thicket has led various economists to question the optimality
of the current patent system (e.g. Gallini and Scotchmer (2002), Jaffe and Lerner
(2004) and Shapiro (2001)) or even to propose the elimination of it (e.g. Quah (2006),
Boldrin and Levine (2002) and Bessen and Maskin (2000)).
Signing broad cross-license agreements, some firms endogenously react to the
patent thicket choosing not to enforce their intellectual property at all. Analyz-
ing these contractual arrangements, I have shed some lights on the characteristics of
these firms.
To uncover the incentives behind these contracts, I have developed a model of
bargaining with learning in which firms litigate over their patent disputes if they do
not agree upon a cross-license. The model predicts that the incentive to litigate de-
creases with firm investment in specific technology. More precisely, I have shown that
whereas firms with low asset specificity prefer not to sign a cross-license agreement,
firms with high sunk costs are better off cross-licensing their intellectual property. In
addition, the model predicts that firms with intermediate levels of sunk costs will en-
gage in inefficient “persuasive” litigation aimed at obtaining a better deal in a broad
cross-license contract.
I have tested the predictions of the model using a novel dataset merging data
on cross-license agreements, patent litigation and financial variables for firms in the
semiconductor industry. Adopting a two-stage estimation strategy I have shown that
the data provide strong support to the predictions of the bargaining game. More
specifically, I have shown that whereas the presence of strategic interaction between
two firms is mostly determined by their technological closeness, the choice between
cross-license and litigation is uniquely determined by firms’ capital intensities. More-
over, the empirical analysis confirms the existence of “persuasive” litigation among
firms with intermediate values of capital intensity.
I have exploited the dataset to analyze the potential effects of a patent litigation
reform as the one recently requested by a coalition of leading technology companies.
Because of the skewed capital intensity distribution of semiconductor firms, I have
concluded that a reform may induce a substantial reduction in the number of broad
cross-license agreements.
The paper can be extended in various directions. Theoretically the model con-
siders two firms only. Extending the framework to more than two players may help
understanding what externalities cross-licensing implies, and what determines a net-
work structure as the one observed in the semiconductor industry. Moreover, enlarg-
ing the number of players may lead to interesting results about the distribution of
bargaining power and its effects on technology transmission (see Galasso (2007) for
a theoretical treatment of bargaining power in these contractual settings).
Empirically it may be valuable to consider the possible effects of property right
fragmentation on firms incentives to litigate. To construct a fragmentation index
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similar to those in Ziedonis (2004) and Noel and Schankerman (2006) will be crucial
to understand this effect. Secondly, it would be valuable to perform an empirical
analysis similar to the one of this paper to a different industry where innovation is
less cumulative (as chemicals or pharmaceuticals) and where cross-licensing is more
likely to be due to technological complementarities. Comparing the empirical evidence
from these two settings may improve our understanding of cross-license agreements
and may show how the very same contractual arrangements may be generated by
completely different incentives.
References
[1] Ai, C. and Norton E., 2003, Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit Models, Eco-
nomics Letters 80, 123-129.
[2] Amemiya, T., 1984, Tobit Models: A Survey, Journal of Econometrics 24,3-61.
[3] Anderlini L. and Felli L.,2001, Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation, Economet-
rica 69,377-411.
[4] Babcock L. and Loewenstein G.,1997, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role
of Self-Serving Biases, Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, 109-126.
[5] Barton J.H.,2000, Reforming the Patent System, Science 287,1933-1934.
[6] Bebchuck L. A., 1984, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information,
RAND Journal of Economics 15, 404-415.
[7] Bessen J. and Maskin E, 2000, Sequential Innovation Patents and Imitation,
working paper 00-01, MIT.
[8] Binmore K., Rubinstein A. and Wolinsky A., The Nash Bargaining Solution in
Economic Modelling, RAND Journal of Economics 17, 176-188.
[9] Bloom, N., Schankerman, M. and Van Reenen, J.,2005, Identifying technological
spillovers and product market rivalry, CEP Discussion Paper 06-75.
[10] Boldrin M. and Levine D.K., 2002, The Case Against Intellectual Property,
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 92, 209-212.
[11] Cai H., 2000, Delay in Multilateral Bargaining under Complete Information,
Journal of Economic Theory 93, 260-276.
30
[12] Choi J.P., 2002, Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Lit-
igation, mimeo.
[13] Department of Justice,1995, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property.
[14] Fershtman C. and Kamien M.I., 1992, Cross Licensing of Complementary Tech-
nologies, International Journal of Industrial Organization 10, 329-348.
[15] Galasso A., 2007, Bargaining Power in Technology Licensing and Cross Licens-
ing, PhD Thesis London School of Economics.
[16] Gallini N. and Scotchmer S.,2002, Intellectual Property: When is it the Best
Incentive Mechanism? , in Innovation Policy and the Economy, Vol 2, Adam
Jaffe, Joshua Lerner and Scott Stern, eds, MIT Press, pp. 51-78.
[17] Grindley, P. and Teece D., 1997, Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing and
Cross Licensing in Semiconductor and Electronics, California Management Re-
view 39, 8-41.
[18] Hall, B. and Ziedonis, R., 2001, The Patent Paradox Revisited: an empirical
study of patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry 1979-1985, Rand Journal
of Economics 32, 101-128.
[19] Harrison M. and Kreps D., 1978 , Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock
Market with Heterogeneous Expectations, Quarterly Journal of Economics 92,
323-336.
[20] Heckman, J.J.,1979, Sample Selection Bias and Specification Error, Economet-
rica 47, 153-162.
[21] Heller M.A. and Eiseberg R.S., 2001, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The An-
ticommons in Biomedical Research, Science 280,698-701.
[22] Jaffe, A.,1986, Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D: Evidence from
Firms’ Patents, Profits and Market Value, American Economic Review 76, 984-
1001.
[23] Jaffe, A.,1988, Demand and Supply Influences in R&D Intensity and Productivity
Growth, Review of Economics and Statistics 70,431-437.
[24] Jaffe, A. and Lerner J., 2004, Innovation and Its Discontents, Princeton Univer-
stiy Press.
[25] Kamien M.I.and Tauman Y., 1986. Fees versus royalties and the private value of
a patent, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, 471-491.
31
[26] Kamien M.I. and Tauman Y., 2002, Patent licensing: the inside story,
Manchester School 70, 7-15.
[27] Katz M. ans Shapiro C., 1985, On the Licensing of Innovations, Rand Journal
of Economics 16,504-520.
[28] Kennan J. and Wilson R., 1993, Bargaining with Private Information, Journal
of Economic Literature 31, 45-104.
[29] Landes, W.M., 1971, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, Journal of Law and
Economics 14, 61-107.
[30] Lanjouw J. and Lerner J.,1998, The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights:
A Survey of the Empirical Literature, Annales D’Economie et Statistique 49,
224-244.
[31] Lanjouw J. and Lerner J.,2001, Tilting the Table? The use of preliminary in-
junctions, Journal of Law and Economics 44, 573-603.
[32] Lanjouw J. and Schankerman M.,2001, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A
Window on Competition, RAND Journal of Economics 32,129-151.
[33] Lanjouw J. and Schankerman M.,2004, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights:
Are Small Firms Handicapped?, Journal of Law and Economics 47, 45-74.
[34] Lerner, J. and Tirole J., 2004, Efficient Patent Pools , American Economic Re-
view 94, 691-711.
[35] Lerner, J, Strojwas, M.,and Tirole, J., 2003, Cooperative Marketing Agreements
Between Competitors: Evidence from Patent Pools, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research Working Paper No. 9680.
[36] Marjit, S., Mukerjee A. and Shi L.H.,2001, Cooperation in R&D: the case of
patent infringement agreements, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
45, 383-401.
[37] Morris S.,1994, Trade with Heterogeneous Beliefs and Asymmetric Information,
Econometrica 62, 1327-1348.
[38] Morris S.,1995, The common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory, Economics
and Philosopy 11, 227-253.
[39] Noel M. and Schankerman M., 2006, Strategic Patenting and Software Innova-
tion, CEPR Discussion Papers 5701.
[40] Ornaghi C., 2005, Mergers and Innovation: the Case of the Pharmaceutical In-
dustry, mimeo University of Southampton.
32
[41] Perry M. and Reny P.,1993, A Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategi-
cally Timed Offers, Journal of Economic Theory 59, 50-77
[42] Pooley R., 2000, The trouble with Patents, California Lawyer, October.
[43] Posner R., 1972, The Behaviour of Administrative Agencies, Journal od Legal
Studies 1, 305-320.
[44] Quah, D.,2006, A World Without Intellectual Property (Rights), mimeo LSE.
[45] Roth D., 1996, Rationalizable Predatory Pricing, Journal of Economic Theory
68, 380-396.
[46] Savage L.,1954, The Foundations of Statistics, John Wiley and Sons.
[47] SchankermanM. and Scotchmer S., 2001, Damages and Injunctions in Protecting
Intellectual Property, RAND Journal of Economics 32, 199-220.
[48] Semiconductor Industry Association, 2005, 2020 is Closer than you Think, 2005
Annual Report.
[49] Shapiro, C., 2001, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools
and Standard Setting in Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume I, Adam
Jaffe, Joshua Lerner, and Scott Stern, eds., MIT Press, 2001.
[50] Siebert R. and von Graevenitz G., 2005, How Licensing Resolves Hold-Up: Evi-
dence from a Dynamic Panel Data Model with Unobserved Heterogeneity, CEPR
Discussion Paper 5436
[51] Spencer W. and Grindley P.,2003, SEMATECH After Five years: High-
Technology Consortia and U.S. competitiveness, California Management Review
35, 9-32.
[52] Turley J., 2005, The Essential Guide to Semiconductors, Prentice Hall Profes-
sional Technical Reference.
[53] Van de Ven W. and Van Praag B., 1981, The Demand for Deductibles in Private
Health Insurance, Journal of Econometrics 17, 229-252.
[54] Watanabe Y., 2005, Learning and Bargaining in Dispute Resolution: Theory and
Evidence from Medical Malpractice Litigation, working paper.
[55] Willis R. and Rosen S., 1979, Education and Self-Selection, Journal of Political
Economy 87, 7-36
[56] Yildiz M.,2003, Bargaining Without a Common Prior - An Immediate Agreement
Theorem, Econometrica 71, 793-811
33
[57] Yildiz M.,2004, Waiting to Persuade, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 223-
248
[58] Ziedonis R., 2003, Patent Litigation in the U.S. Semiconductor Indutury, in
Wesley M Cohen and Stephen A Merrill, editors, Patents in the Knowledge-
based Economy,180-215
[59] Ziedonis R., 2004, Don’t Fence Me In: Fragmented Markets for Technology and
the Patent Acquisition Strategies of Firms, Management Science 50, 804-820
34
Appendix
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
In the absence of optimism, there will be agreement only if the duopolistic surplus
exceeds the surplus from litigation: i.e αV − 2F ≥ u+ u(k). For low values of k this
inequality is not satisfied and there is equality at 1−
4L
F
+
V (1− α)
F
= k.
Define now V it (m) as the continuation value of i at (m, t) and St as social surplus
St = V
1
t (m) + V
2
t (m). From Yildiz (2004) we know that St is deterministic and does
not depend on m.
I define the agreement regime the case in which
αV − 2F
1− δ
≥ u+ u(k) + δSt+1. (9)
In this case the player chosen by the nature extracts the rent
αV − 2F
1− δ
− u −
u(k)− δSt+1. I define the no agreement regime the case in which (9) is not satisfied.
In this case the rent extracted is zero. I can therefore define the rent extracted in
period t as:
Rt = max
{
αV − 2F
1− δ
− u− u(k)− δSt+1, 0
}
.
Moreover
V it = p
i
t(m) [Rt + u− u(k)]+u(k)+δE(V
i
t+1) =
∞∑
s=t
δs−t
[
pit(m) (Rs + u− u(k)) + u(k)
]
where the second equality follows because the current continuation value is the infinite
sum over expected future rents.
This can be re-written as
V it (m) = p
i
t(m)Λt +
u(k)
1− δ
and it implies that
St = (1 + yt)Λt +
2u(k)
1− δ
where Λt =
∑
∞
s=t δ
s−t (Rt + u− u(k)).
From the previous definitions it is possible to observe that in the agreement regime:
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Rt =
αV − 2F
1− δ
−u−u(k)−δSt+1 =
αV − 2F
1− δ
−u−u(k)−δ
[
(1 + yt+1)Λt+1 +
2u(k)
1− δ
]
.
In addition the definition of Λt implies that Λt = Rt + u− u(k) + δΛt+1 and this
condition can be used to obtain this difference equation:
Λt =
αV − 2F − 2u(k)
1− δ
− δyt+1Λt+1.
Notice now that a condition to have agreement is
αV − 2F
1− δ
≥ u+ u(k) + δSt = u+ u(k) + δ(1 + yt)Λt +
2δu(k)
1− δ
.
I can rewrite this condition as
Λt ≤
αV − 2F − 2u− (u− u(k))(1− δ)
(1− δ)δ(1 + yt)
≡ Dt
From Yildiz (2004) lemma 6, lemma 7 and lemma 8, we know that another con-
dition to have agreement is
Bt ≡
(αV − 2F − 2u(k))
(1− δ)(1 + δyt+1)
≤
αV − 2F − 2u(k)− (u− u(k))(1− δ)
(1− δ)δ(1 + yt)
= Dt.
This condition can be rewritten as
yt − yt+1 ≤
1− δ
δ
−
(u− u(k))(1− δ)(1 + δyt+1)
(αV − 2F − 2u(k))δ
(10)
or as
(1− δ)(αV −2F −u(k)−u) ≥ (yt−yt+1)δ(αV −2F −2u(k))+(u−u(k))(1− δ)δyt+1
that clearly describes the agreement trade-off. On the left hand side there is the
rent lost with a delay in the agreement, on the right hand side there is the expected
gain in future rent due to learning adjusted by the overestimated probability of being
the patentee.
Let us rewrite (10) as:
yt − yt+1 ≤
1− δ
δ
− A(k, α)
(1− δ)(1 + δyt+1)
δ
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The formula
A(k, α) =
(u− u(k))
αV − 2F − 2u(k)
=
1
2
(V − F (1− k))
2L− F (1− k) +
αV
2
is what differentiate my model from the one of Yildiz (2004) in which the outside
options u and u(k) are not present. It is easy to see that A(k, α) is a function
decreasing both in k 12 and in α, therefore with an increase in capital intensity (higher
k) the right hand side of (10) increases. Therefore an increase in capital intensity
allows for agreement for higher values of yt − yt+1. Since yt − yt+1 is decreasing in t
and approaches zero as t→∞ there exists some real number tu such that Bt ≤ Dt
if and only if t ≥ tu. In addition tu is decreasing in k.
Using the formula for the beliefs we can characterize the value of k above which
there is immediate agreement. Notice that
y0 − y1 =
∆
n
−
∆
n+ 1
=
∆
n(n+ 1)
.
The condition necessary to have immediate agreement is therefore:
∆
n(n+ 1)
≤
1− δ
δ
− A(k, α)
(1− δ)
δ
(1 +
δ∆
n+ 1
). (11)
Notice that k∗ is defined as the value of k for which (11) holds with equality. I
can re-write (11) as
z ≤
1− δ
δ
[1− A(k, α) (1 + δy1)] ≡ g(k, α, δ) (12)
where z =
∆
n(n+ 1)
.
Notice that A(k, α) = 1 and A(1, α) =
V/2
αV/2 + 2L
> 1/2.
Notice that g(k, α, δ) is positive as long as
δ ≤
1− A(k, α)
A(k, α)y1
≡ δ.
In this range, the function g(k, α, δ) is a decreasing continuous function in δ with
lim
δ→0
g(k, α, δ) = +∞
and
lim
δ→δ
g(k, α, δ) = 0.
12It’s derivative is negative as long as αV > 4L that satisfies our parameter restrictions.
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This result guarantees that for every k > k it is possible to find a discount factor
δ̂ for which immediate agreement arises as an equilibrium if δ ≤ δ̂ (indeed notice that
δ = 0 only if 1 = A(k, α)).
Finally because of the implicit function theorem it is possible to see that
dδ̂
dk
> 0
that proves Proposition 1.
Applying the implicit function theorem to (12) it is easy to see that
dδ̂
dα
> 0.
The following figure summarizes these results.
7.0.1 Derivation of the Ordered Probit Likelihood Function
Following Van De Ven and Van Praag (1981) and I am interested in the following
likelihood function:
L =
∏
CONTACT=0
P ( y∗1 ≤ 0)
∏
OUTCOME=1
P ( y∗2 < c1 ∧ y
∗
1 > 0)∏
OUTCOME=2
P ( c1 < y
∗
2 < c2 ∧ y
∗
1 > 0)
∏
OUTCOME=3
P ( c2 < y
∗
2 ∧ y
∗
1 > 0).
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Assuming that u1 and u2 are bivariate standard normally distributed with corre-
lation coefficient ρ and cumulative distribution Φ2 it is easy to see that
P ( y∗1ij ≤ 0) = P (x
′
1ijβ1 + u1ij < 0) = P (u1ij < −x
′
1ijβ1) = Φ(−x
′
1ijβ1).
Moreover
P ( y∗2 < c1 ∧ y
∗
1 > 0) = P (u2 < c1 − x
′
2ijβ2, u1 > −x
′
1ijβ1, ρ)
= 1− (1− Φ(c1 − x
′
2ijβ2))− Φ2(c1 − x
′
2ijβ2,−x
′
1ijβ1, ρ)
= Φ(c1 − x
′
2ijβ2)− Φ2(c1 − x
′
2ijβ2,−x
′
1ijβ1, ρ).
Similarly
P ( c1 < y
∗
2 < c2 ∧ y
∗
1 > 0) =
= P (u2 < c2 − x
′
2ijβ2, u1 > −x
′
1ijβ1, ρ)− P (u2 < c1 − x
′
2ijβ2, u1 > −x
′
1ijβ1, ρ)
= Φ(c2 − x
′
2ijβ2)− Φ2(c2 − x
′
2ijβ2,−x
′
1ijβ1, ρ)− Φ(c1 − x
′
2ijβ2)
+Φ2(c1 − x
′
2ijβ2,−x
′
1ijβ1, ρ).
Finally notice that
P ( c2 < y
∗
2 ∧ y
∗
1 > 0) =
= 1− Φ(−x′1ijβ1)− Φ(c2 − x
′
2ijβ2) + Φ2(c2 − x
′
2ijβ2,−x
′
1ijβ1, ρ)
Combining these results I obtain the formula for the likelihood function:
L =
∏
CONTACT=0
Φ(−x′1ijβ1)
∏
OUTCOME=1
[
Φ(c1 − x
′
2ijβ2)− Φ2(c1 − x
′
2ijβ2,−x
′
1ijβ1, ρ)
]
×
∏
OUTCOME=2
[
Φ(c2 − x
′
2ijβ2)− Φ2(c2 − x
′
2ijβ2,−x
′
1ijβ1, ρ)− Φ(c1 − x
′
2ijβ2)
+Φ2(c1 − x
′
2ijβ2,−x
′
1ijβ1, ρ)
]
×
∏
OUTCOME=3
[
1− Φ(−x′1ijβ1)− Φ(c2 − x
′
2ijβ2) + Φ2(c2 − x
′
2ijβ2,−x
′
1ijβ1, ρ)
]
Proof of Proposition 4
Recalling that k = 1−
4L
F
+
V (1− α)
F
it is easy to see that
dk
dL
< 0.
Moreover, a total differentiation of (12) shows that
dk∗
dL
< 0 as well.
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Mean Median Std Dev
Total Portfolio 788.92 133 1616.84
Portfolio Ratio 53.90 5.52 241.26
Patent Intensity 106.85 66.48 119.12
Average Capital Intensity 214.4 172.39 148.21
Capital Intensity Ratio 3.17 2.09 3.34
Minimum Employment 840 289 2125
TECH 0.21 0.14 0.24
LINK 0.03 0.00 0.22
SIC 0.20 0.00 0.27
BSVSIC 0.56 0.70 0.40
Average Sunkness Index 1.07 1.00 0.78
Table 1
Summary Statistics  for Firm Pairings 
Summary Statistics for 4465 firm pairings. TECH: measure of technologial distance. LINK: measure of technological overlapping. 
BSVSIC and SIC: measures of product market similarity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TECH LINK SIC BSVSIC
TECH 1.00
LINK 0.27 1.00
SIC 0.10 0.09 1.00
BSVSIC 0.10 0.02 0.13 1.00
Measures Correlation
Table 2
Correlation among technological and product market distance measures. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 3 
Comparison of Means: CONTACT  
  
No Contact Contact 
   
Total Portfolio 766.63 2930.39 
 (23.71) (480.75) 
Portfolio Ratio 54.01 42.68 
 (3.64) (14.33) 
Patent Intensity 106.32 157.72 
 (1.78) (24.09) 
   
Average Capital Intensity 213.94 257.94 
 (2.23) (20.58) 
Capital Intensity Ratio 3.18 2.11 
 (0.05) (0.17) 
Average Sunkness Index 1.06 1.70 
 (0.01) (0.11) 
   
Minimum Employment 820.05 2769.78 
 (31.50) (542.96) 
   
TECH 0.21 0.54 
 (0.00) (0.03) 
LINK 0.02 0.55 
 (0.00) (0.17) 
   
SIC 0.20 0.32 
 (0.00) (0.03) 
BSVSIC 0.56 0.60 
 (0.00) (0.05) 
      
Mean comparison among parings with and without contact. Contact=1 if the firm pair discloses litigation or cross-
license; Contact=0 otherwise. Standard Errors in brackets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Litigation Only Litigation & CL CL only
Total Portfolio 1652.09 3738.37 4829.75
(599.50) (847.74) (1074.45)
Portfolio Ratio 26.10 61.28 51.07
(11.64) (36.58) (22.78)
Patent Intensity 151.30 178.87 133.09
(41.77) (37.61) (27.68)
Average Capital Intensity 197.23 262.54 415.62
(21.72) (27.21) (59.36)
Capital Intensity Ratio 1.88 1.83 3.28
(0.17) (0.20) (0.63)
Average Sunkness Index 1.29 2.00 2.25
(0.16) (0.16) (0.25)
Minimum Employment 1497.27 3476.56 4855.62
(414.66) (877.50) (2185.93)
TECH 0.57 0.48 0.59
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
LINK 0.30 0.78 0.80
(0.10) (0.38) (0.55)
SIC 0.29 0.34 0.34
(0.04) (0.06) (0.09)
BSVSIC 0.48 0.70 0.76
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
Table 4
Comparison of Means: OUTCOME
 Litigation Only: 22 pairings that litigated and did not cross-license. Litigation and CL: 16 pairings that cross-license after litigation. CL 
only: 8 pairings that cross-license without litigation. Std Errors in brackets.
  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Portfolio (x1000) 0.09 (0.02)** 0.14 (0.06)* 0.09 (0.02)** 0.07(0.02)** 0.13 (0.04)**
Portfolio Ratio(x1000) -0.35 (0.67)
Total Portfolio2(x1000) -0.06 (0.39)
Average Sunkness Index 0.15 (0.12)
Average Capital Intensity (x1000) -0.53  (0.60)
Capital Intensity Ratio -0.06 (0.03)
Minimum  Employment -0.01 (0.02)
Patent Intensity (x1000) -0.01 (0.77)
TECH 1.30 (0.19)** 1.29 (0.20)** 1.28 (0.19)** 1.23 (0.23)** 1.29 (0.26)**
LINK 0.33 (0.06)** 0.35 (0.07)** 0.31 (0.06)** 0.34 (0.07)** 0.32 (0.11)**
SIC 0.33 (0.17)
BSVSIC -0.16 (0.13)
Constant -2.96 (0.12)** -2.99 (0.12)** -3.03 (0.13)** -3.12 (0.12)** -2.60 (0.18)**
Number of Observations 4465 4465 4465 4465 4465
Log Pseudolikelihood -205.17 -204.91 -204.30 -203.65 -201.72
Pseudo R2 0.199 0.200 0.203 0.205 0.212
Table 5
Probit Regression: CONTACT
Probit Regression, dependent variable CONTACT=1 if litigation or cross-license registered for a firm pairing. Robust standard erroros in brackets. ** significant at 1% * significant at 5%.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Median 90th Percentile
Total Portfolio (x104) 0.001 0.001 0.001
TECH 0.18
LINK 0.004
Maringal Effects evaluated of CONTACT probit. In column (1) marginal effects are evaluated at the mean for all three variables, in column 2 
and column 3 TECH and LINK are mantained at their mean value and Total Portfolio is at the Median and 90th percentile
Table 6
Probit Regression: Total Portfolio Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Capital Intensity (x1000) 5.08 (1.71)** 4.99 (1.70)** 5.42 (1.49)**
Average Sunkness Index 0.88 (0.21)**
Total Portfolio (x1000) 0.02 (0.10) -0.01 (0.08) -0.01 (0.08)
SIC 0.72 (0.95) 0.78 (0.65)
BSVSIC 0.92 (0.61)
Minimum Employment 1.71 (6.77) -0.29 (8.88) 3.83 (7.75)
Constant 1 1.86 2.68 2.81 2.12
Constant 2 0.61 1.38 1.50 0.91
Ro -0.26 (0.32) -0.06  (0.50) -0.14 (0.51) -0.40 (0.35)
First Stage
Total Portfolio (x1000) 0.09 (0.02)** 0.09 (0.02)** 0.09 (0.02)** 0.09 (0.02)**
TECH 1.28 (0.18)** 1.30 (0.19)** 1.29 (0.24)** 1.28 (0.23)**
LINK 0.34 (0.06)** 0.33 (0.06)** 0.34 (0.12)** 0.34 (0.11)**
Number of Observations 4465 4465 4465 4465
Log Pseudolikelihood -244.09 -243.65 -242.55 -243.13
Tobit II Regression: OUTCOME
Table 7
Tobit II Maximum Likelihood Regression. First Stage: probit on CONTACT. Second Stage: Ordered Probit  on OUTCOME. OUTCOME =1 if the pairing resolves dispute by 
litigation and not cross-license. OUTCOME=2 if cross-license is delayed. OUTCOME=3 if immediate cross-license. Ro =corelation between first and second stage errors. 
Robust standard errors adjusted for Name Clusters reported in parenthesis. * significant at 5% **significant at 1%.  
 
